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 For quite some time it was unclear if Kant ever read Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (TMS). In contrast to the Wealth of Nations, which Kant cites directly in the 
Metaphysics of Morals (see MS, AA 06:289.12-14)1, it was only once Kant’s many unpublished 
reflections and lecture notes on moral philosophy were widely available in the Academy Edition 
that scholars have been confident that Kant read the TMS after the first German translation 
was published in 1770.2 Above all others, the efforts of Walter Eckstein (2010), Samuel 
Fleischacker (1991), Heiner Klemme (2000), and Susan Meld Shell (1980) have shown that in 
many cases Kant’s terminology, his choice of examples, and his understanding of concepts like 
impartiality, not to mention certain important letters from his correspondence, all illustrate 
that there is no doubt that Kant read the TMS, and likely soon after the first German 
translation was published. Thus, in their contribution to the Cambridge History of Eighteenth-
Century Philosophy, for example, David Norton and Manfred Kuehn confidently remark that 
“Kant knew well and appreciated highly” Smith’s TMS, “at least during the early [seventeen-
]seventies” (2000, 978). This confidence is a relatively recent achievement in the history of 
Kant scholarship, however, and although it is now all but certain that Kant read the TMS, 
much work remains to be done in order to determine whether or not the TMS had a lasting 
impact on Kant’s thinking, and in what way. Recent scholarship has discussed Smith’s 
anticipation of Kant’s moral argument for the existence of God3, but insufficient attention has 
                                                        
1 Citations from Kant’s works use the Akademie Ausgabe (Kant 1900ff.) and adopt the recommended 
citation style of Kant-Studien, whereby the abbreviation of a work, e.g. KpV, is followed by the Akademie 
Ausgabe (AA) volume, page, and, if possible, line number. English translations are given in the main 
body of the text and the original German passages are provided in footnotes. In general, I follow the 
English translations in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant and note where I deviate 
from them. Translations from the Kaehler and Feyerabend lecture notes are my own. 
2 Adam Smith. Theorie der moralischen Empfindungen. Translated by Christian Günther Rautenberg. 
Braunschweig, 1770. 
3 See Schliesser (2017, 342) and Fleischacker (2004, ch. 15; and 2017). See McHugh (2017), White 
(2010), and Richardson (2017) for other recent discussions of Kant and Smith. 
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been given to one of the main reasons why Kant would have been interested in the TMS in the 
first place4, namely Smith’s careful analysis of the passions and human motivation. The 
following discussion seeks to remedy this by illustrating a fairly substantial, but 
underappreciated, way in which Smith’s understanding of motivation had a lasting and 
significant impact on Kant’s moral philosophy. I will argue that Kant’s concept of respect 
(Achtung) for the moral law as the incentive of action with moral worth has roots in Smith’s 
understanding of the attitude of ‘regard’ for the general rules of conduct and the related motive 
of the ‘sense of duty’. 
 Respect is arguably one of the most characteristic, and also one of the most 
controversial, features of Kant’s moral philosophy. In recent decades, for example, respect has 
been at the centre of an expansive debate concerning Kant’s account of moral motivation.5 At 
the same time, and surprisingly, this large body of secondary literature has not considered 
whether respect for the moral law as an incentive is unique to Kant’s moral philosophy or 
whether it might have historical precedent. More than a century ago, however, August Oncken 
indicated that a similar use of Achtung could be found in the first German translation of the 
TMS. In his detailed analysis of the ways in which Kant’s and Smith’s writings are 
linguistically similar, Oncken remarks that:  
The concern with and consciousness of this inner moral law is the “worth” (“dignity”) of human 
beings, and the drive to obey the commands of this law takes place similarly in both theories 
through the feeling of respect [Achtung] for the majesty of this moral law (‘reverentia’ for Kant, 
‘reverence’ for Smith). (1877, 92)6 
To cite an example of how Smith uses “reverence,” or his more preferred term “regard,” as well 
as how these terms were translated into German, consider the following passage from the TMS 
where Smith discusses the scenario of visiting a friend and being tempted to treat them poorly 
for no good reason other than that you’re in a bad mood: 
What renders you incapable of such a rudeness, is nothing but a regard [Achtung] to the general 
rules of civility and hospitality, which prohibit it. That habitual reverence [Achtung] which your 
                                                        
4 See Klemme (2000, viii) 
5 The sum total of literature is too expansive to mention here. Important contributions that reference 
the major relevant literature on this debate include Reath (1989), Allison (1990), O’Neill (2013), Sytsma 
(1993) McCarty (2009), and Ware (2014). 
6 “Die Pflege und das Bewusstsein dieses inneren Sittengesetzes macht die „Würde“ („dignity“) des 
Menschen aus und der Antrieb, den Geboten desselben zu gehorchen, geschieht abermals 
gemeinschaftlich in beiden Theorien durch das Gefühl der Achtung vor der Majestät dieses 
Sittengesetzes (reverentia bei Kant, reverence bei Smith).“ (Oncken, 1877, 92) 
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former experience has taught you for these enables you to act, upon all such occasions, with 
nearly equal propriety, and hinders those inequalities of temper, to which all men are subject, 
from influencing your conduct in any very sensible degree. (TMS 232; III.5.2; and see Smith 
1770, 316)7 
Oncken went no further than to point out the terminological similarity between Kant and Smith. 
Indeed, Oncken was a proponent of the view that, although the similarities between their 
philosophies warrant a detailed comparison, we cannot be sure that Kant ever had direct 
exposure to the TMS. (see 1877, 97) Now that we know Kant read the TMS, if one takes a 
closer look at the meaning of the concept of Achtung in the first German translation of the 
TMS, one notices not only an interesting terminological similarity between Kant and Smith, but 
a striking conceptual similarity as well. My aim in the following is not merely to demonstrate 
this conceptual similarity. Rather, my aim is also to illustrate that they are similar in such a 
way that the concept of Achtung in the 1770 German translation of the TMS likely had a 
positive and lasting influence on Kant’s mature moral philosophy. In particular, I argue that 
Smith’s concept of regard and the associated idea of the sense of duty, translated as Achtung and 
das Gefühl der Pflicht respectively, would have offered Kant a way to deal with a problem 
concerning moral motivation that he was struggling to solve during his pre-Critical 
development. 
 The following discussion is divided into three main sections. In the next section (2.) I 
illustrate that Kant’s concept of respect for the moral law as the incentive of action with moral 
worth appeared relatively late in his intellectual development. While other uses of respect are 
present in his early writings, his technical understanding of respect occurs for the first time in 
the mid-1780s. I illustrate that this is in large part due to the fact that it took Kant a long time 
to solve an important problem surrounding the workings of moral motivation. In section three 
(3.) I turn to Smith and provide an analysis of his understanding of the attitude of ‘regard’ for 
the general rules of conduct and the related idea of the ‘sense of duty’ as a motive of action. In 
section four (4.) I turn to Kant in order to show that his understanding of respect is remarkably 
similar to Smith’s understanding of regard and the sense of duty: on a basic level, Kant’s 
                                                        
7 References to Smith are taken from the third edition of the TMS (Smith 1767), as this is the edition 
that formed the basis of the 1770 German translation and which is therefore the edition, with which 
Kant was familiar. For ease of reference, I include the page number from the third edition followed by 
the section, chapter, and paragraph number from the now standard Glasgow Edition of Smith’s works 
(Smith 1976). When necessary I also occasionally include the corresponding page number from the 1770 
German translation. 
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concept of respect is both an attitude and a feeling, and these are two aspects of a single 
complex phenomenon. I explain how such a concept would offer a way to deal with the problem 
of moral motivation that Kant was trying to solve, and thereby suggest that there is reason to 
believe that Kant adopted core features of this concept from Smith. I conclude by outlining 
some important differences between Kant and Smith and drawing some implications from the 
account I have offered for our understanding of Kant’s relation to Smith more generally. In the 
end I argue that the concept of respect illustrates an important way in which Smith’s TMS had 
a lasting influence on Kant’s moral philosophy long after his first exposure to it. 
 
1. Achtung in Kant’s Pre-Critical Writings and the Problem of Moral Motivation 
 
 Kant’s technical understanding of respect for the moral law as the incentive of action 
with moral worth appears relatively late in his intellectual development. The first appearance of 
the concept in his published writings is in the Groundwork’s third proposition, where we are 
told that “duty is the necessity of an action from respect for the law”. (GMS, AA 04:400.18-19)8 The 
first chronological appearance of the term in any of his writings, published or unpublished, is in 
the Feyerabend lecture notes on natural law dating from 1784, the time during which Kant was 
writing the Groundwork. In these notes Kant states for the first time that “We must do moral 
actions merely from duty and respect for the moral law, without the lowest incentives”. (V-
NR/Feyerabend, AA 27:1326)9 Kant implies here that respect is the incentive of moral action 
and he goes on to mention many other features that are central to his later published view, such 
as that what obligates us must be mere lawfulness (V-NR/Feyerabend, AA 27:1326), that “the 
law as a law must determine” the will, and that this is just to say “we must have respect for the 
law”. (V-NR/Feyerabend, AA 27:1326)10 
 Kant’s technical understanding of respect as the incentive of moral action, which will be 
discussed in more detail in section 3, is entirely absent from all of his writings prior to 1784. 
During the 1770s, for example, in the Kaehler lecture notes Kant uses Achtung only when he 
speaks more colloquially of the Achtung between parents and children (see V-
                                                        
8 “Pflicht ist die Nothwendigkeit einer Handlung aus Achtung fürs Gesetz“ (GMS, AA 04:400.18-19). 
9 “Wir müssen die moralischen Handlungen, ohne die geringsten Triebfedern, bloß aus Pflicht und 
Achtung fürs moralische Gesetz thun“. (V-NR/Feyerabend, AA 27:1326) 
10 “so muß ihn das Gesetz als Gesetz bestimmen [...] er muß also Achtung fürs Gesetz haben“. (V-
NR/Feyerabend, AA 27:1326) 
 5 
Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 246), between friends (see ibid., 303 and 336), and respecting the rights of 
others (ibid., 282, 284, 311, 352). He also speaks of respecting the commands of God (see ibid., 
162-3), but does not speak of respecting moral commands. Although he mentions that being 
honour-worthy deserves respect (ibid., 76), and more generally that the inner worth of virtue 
deserves respect (ibid., 200), a view that approximates Kant’s mature view, there is no mention 
of any kind of a moral principle deserving respect.  
Kant’s technical understanding of respect for the moral law as the incentive of moral 
action is absent from his published pre-Critical writings as well. In these texts there are various 
references to respect for women (GSE, AA 02:248 and GSE, AA 02:229), a man’s respect for his 
wife (GSE, AA 02:220, BBGSE, AA 20:120), as well as two of the core kinds of respect in Kant’s 
mature moral philosophy, namely respect for persons on the basis of merit (GSE, AA 02:213) 
and respect for persons simply as persons (Refl, AA 19:513, and V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24:176). 
We also find references to respecting the worth of humanity (GSE, AA 02:217 and GSE, AA 
02:221; Br, AA 13:375 and Refl, AA 19:241) and respecting the right of humanity (Refl, AA 
15:611, Refl, AA 15:625, Refl, AA 19:162, and Refl, AA 19:225). Although there are places 
where Kant speaks of respecting the commands of God (Refl, AA 18:724) and respecting civil 
laws (19:590), there is no mention of respect for a moral law or principle, nor is there reference 
to respect as a potential motive or incentive, let alone the only proper moral incentive, 
anywhere in the pre-Critical period. 
Of course, one reason why Kant does not discuss respect for the moral law during his 
pre-Critical period is that he had not yet developed his mature conception of the moral law or 
the categorical imperative at this time.11 The only passage that mentions an idea resembling 
the categorical imperative during the 1770s is the following, also from the Kaehler notes: 
“Morality is the agreement of action with a universally valid law of free choice. All morality is 
the relation of action to the universal rule”. (V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 64.30-65.1-3)12 This 
statement is of course far from his mature statements of the categorical imperative and the 
                                                        
11 For a detailed study of the development of Kant’s conception of an imperative, including the 
categorical imperative, see Schwaiger (1999). Although Kant did not have all the elements of his mature 
view of the categorical imperative during the pre-Critical period, see Henrich (1963) and Schmucker 
(1961, Ch. IV) for arguments that Kant had developed important pieces, such as universality and the 
will’s agreement with itself, quite early on. 
12 “Die Moralitaet ist die Uebereinstimmung der Handlung mit einem allgemein gültigen Gesetz der 
freyen Willkür. Alles Moralitaet ist das Verhältniß der Handlung zur allgemeinen Regel“. (V-
Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 64.30-65.1-3) 
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moral law, especially because Kant does not mention what this universal law or rule is. More 
generally, the closest Kant comes to talking about a law deserving respect (besides the 
commands of God) during the pre-Critical period is during a discussion of the distinction 
between ethics and jurisprudence, where Kant states that “Virtue does indeed demand and 
presupposes respect and meticulous observance of human laws, but it [virtue] refers to the 
motive, to the disposition, from which the action, which has juridical correctness, springs”. 
(ibid., 106.28-107.3)13 Kant here refers to the observance of laws as respecting them, but he is 
only talking about “human” or legal laws, not a moral law, and he does not go on to say that the 
virtuous motive itself is respect for the moral law, nor does he talk about respect as an incentive 
as what is essential to the moral disposition. 
The most important reason why the concept of respect is absent from Kant’s pre-
Critical writings, however, is that it took Kant a long time to solve a particular problem 
concerning the workings of moral motivation. In order to understand this problem, we need to 
take a brief look at Kant’s pre-Critical development. Kant’s intellectual development took a 
decisive turn in 1769, Kant’s so-called “great light [großes Licht]” (Refl, AA 18:69.22) when he 
began to reject what Kuehn has called the “continuity thesis” (1995, 376), i.e. the primarily 
epistemological view according to which “the sensitive and the intellectual form a kind of 
continuum” such that “the only difference between intellectual and sensitive cognitions is their 
degree of distinctness.” (1995, 376)14 In contrast to this view, the Inaugural Dissertation argues 
that sensibility and the intellect are two entirely different faculties such that they are different 
in kind, not merely in degree. Rather than it being the case that intellectual cognitions are 
always distinct and sensitive cognitions always confused, and that they differ only in terms of 
their degree of distinctness (and thus are placed along the same continuum), Kant’s view in the 
Inaugural Dissertation is that sensitive cognitions can be distinct, and intellectual ones confused. 
This shift in Kant’s thinking about cognition is important because it altered the way he thought 
about morality. 
It is only after Kant’s “great light” that we find him explicitly endorsing a ‘pure’ or 
‘rational’ moral philosophy. In the Inaugural Dissertation, for example, Kant states that: “Moral 
                                                        
13 “Zwar fordert die Tugend und setzt zum voraus Achtung und peinliche Beobachtung der 
menschlichen Rechte, aber sie geht auf den BewegungsGrund auf die Gessinung, aus dem die Handlung, 
die rectitudinem juridicam hat, entspringt“. (V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 106.28-107.3) 
14 In the Anthropology Kant identifies the “Leibniz-Wolffian school” as maintaining what Kuehn calls the 
continuity thesis, and Kant remarks here that “Leibniz was actually to blame” (Anth, AA 7:140-1n). 
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Philosophy, therefore, in so far as it furnishes the first principles of adjudication, is only cognised 
by the pure understanding and itself belongs to pure philosophy”. (MSI, AA 02:396, translation 
modified)15 This understanding of moral philosophy is significant because it leads to a problem 
when it comes to moral motivation; a problem that Kant famously describes as “the 
philosopher’s stone”: 
Nobody can or will see that the understanding is supposed to have a moving power to judge. 
The understanding can surely judge, but to give this judgement of the understanding force, and 
that it becomes an incentive to move the will to perform the action, this is the philosopher’s 
stone. (V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 68.23-69.5)16 
In the Kaehler notes, from which the above passage is taken, Kant states that “The highest 
principle of all moral judgement lies in the understanding, and the highest principle of all moral 
drive to do this action lies in the heart; this incentive [Triebfeder] is moral feeling.” (V-
Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 57.1-5)17 The problem here is that it becomes impossible to explain how a 
purely intellectual cognition of moral obligation can lead to a sensible incentive when these two 
mental faculties are different in kind and no longer exist along a continuum. In the Kaehler 
notes, this problem is described as follows: moral adjudication or judgement “is the objective 
ground, but not yet the subjective ground” (V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 56.10-12) and a “practical 
error [einen praktischen Fehler]” (V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 57.9-10)18 occurs when the cognition 
or objective ground is present but the incentive or subject ground is not.  
Kant of course both continues to think of the intellect and sensibility as distinct kinds of 
cognition into the Critical period and continues to conceive of moral philosophy as an entirely 
pure discipline, thus it is no surprise that Kant describes the above problem in similar terms in 
his mature writings. In the second Critique, for example, Kant states that “how a law can be of 
itself and immediately a determining ground of the will […] is for human reason an insoluble 
                                                        
15 “Philosophia igitur moralis, quatenus principia diiudicandi prima suppeditat, non cognoscitur nisi 
intellectum purum et pertinent ipsa ad philosophiam puram”. (MSI, AA 02:396.14-17) 
16 “Das kann und wird auch keener einsehen, daß der Verstand sollte eine bewegende Krafft zu urtheilen 
haben. Urtheilen kann der Verstand freylich, aber diesem Verstandes-Urtheil eine Krafft zu geben, und 
daß es eine Triebfeder werde den Willen zu bewegen, die Handlung auszuüben, das ist der Stein der 
Weisen.“ (V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 68.23-69.5) 
17 “Das oberste principium aller moralischen Beurtheilung liegt im Verstande, und das oberste 
Principium alles moralischen Antriebes, diese Handlung zu thun, lieg im Hertzen; diese Triebfeder ist 
das moralische Gefühl.“ (V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 57.1-5) 
18 “Die Billigung der Handlung ist der obiective Grund, aber noch nicht der subjective Grund.“ (V-
Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 56.10-12) 
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problem”. (KpV, AA 05:72.21-23, my emphasis)19 This does not of course preclude the 
possibility that the law does function as a determining ground of the will and has motivating 
power on its own. Indeed, in the second Critique Kant assumes they do and says that, given the 
insolubility of this problem, his task in the ‘Incentives’ chapter is merely “to determine carefully 
in what way the moral law becomes the incentive and, inasmuch as it is, what happens to the 
human faculty of desire as an effect of that determining ground upon it”. (KpV, AA 05:72.18-21, 
my emphasis)20 Kant’s mature response to this task is his doctrine of respect: what happens in 
the mind is that the feeling of respect is necessarily produced by the purely intellectual 
recognition of obligation and this feeling functions as the incentive of moral action. How this 
happens remains inexplicable, but that it does is Kant’s mature view. As illustrated above, 
however, the concept of respect doesn’t make an appearance in Kant’s writings until the mid 
1780s, which is why we find Kant endorsing an entirely different, and less persuasive, solution 
to this problem during the 1770s.  
Kant’s early solution to the problem of moral motivation is that the two sides of moral 
motivation, purely intellectual cognition on the one hand and motivational feeling or the 
incentive on the other, are acquired separately. According to the Kaehler notes: “If I judge via 
the understanding that the action is morally good, much is still missing, that I were to do this 
action, concerning which I have judged. But if this judgement does move me to do the action, 
then that is moral feeling.” (V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 68.19-23)21 Important to note here is that at 
this point in his development ‘moral feeling’ signifies “a capacity to be affected by a moral 
judgement” (V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 68.18)22, but Kant’s language is misleading from the 
perspective of his Critical view. As Klemme points out (see 2006, 123), in the 1770s Kant had 
not yet come to believe a core component of his mature view, namely that moral judgement 
itself can effect the force capable of moving us to action. In Kaehler, we find an alternative view:  
To bring human beings to feel the abhorrence of vice is completely impossible, for I can only say 
to him what my understanding has insight into, and I can indeed bring him so far as to have 
                                                        
19 “wie ein Gesetz für sich und unmittelbar Bestimmungsgrund des Willens sein könnte [...] das ist ein 
für die menschliche Vernunft unauflösliches Problem“. (KpV, AA 05:72.21-23) 
20 “zu bestimmen, auf welche Art das moralische Gesetz Triebfeder werde, und was, indem sie es ist, mit 
dem menschlichen Begehrungsvermögen als Wirkung jenes Bestimmungsgrundes auf dasselbe 
vorgehe“. (KpV, AA 05:72.18-21) 
21 „Wenn ich durch den Verstand urtheile, daß die Handlung sittlich gut ist, so fehlt noch sehr viel, daß 
ich diese Handlung thue, von der ich so gewurtheilt habe. Bewegt mich aber dieses Urtheil, die 
Handlung zu thun, so ist das das moralische Gefühl.“ (V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 68.19-23) 
22 “eine Fähigkeit durch ein moralisches Urtheil afficirt zu werden“. ((V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 68.18) 
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such insight, but that he should feel abhorrence when he does not have such a sensitivity of the 
senses is not possible; […]. (V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 71.25-31)23 
At this point in time Kant therefore seems to think that avoiding ‘practical error’ and actually 
acting morally, not just having correct judgement, is a matter of separately cultivating feeling in 
such a way that it is in accord with moral judgement. Indeed, Kant claims that we can only be 
said to have moral feeling when our feelings match morality in this way:  
Everyone can see that the action is abhorrent, but whoever feels this abhorrence has moral 
feeling. The understanding does not abhor, rather recognizes abhorrence and opposes itself to 
it, but sensibility only has to abhor, now if sensibility abhors that which the understanding 
recognizes to be abhorrent, this is moral feeling. (V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 71.19-25)24 
In order to have this kind of ‘moral’ feeling, i.e. sensible aversion and attraction towards 
objects, our sensibility needs to be cultivated via habit such that it accords with what we judge 
to be morally right and wrong, i.e. what we understand that we ought to desire or abhor. As 
the Kaehler notes say: “Indeed we can only produce a habit that is not natural but stands in for 
nature, which becomes a habit through imitation and frequent practice.” (V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 
72.4-6)25 This is achieved through education and religion (V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 73) and the 
way to do this is not to punish and reward for certain actions, but to make one feel shame for 
having done vicious actions (see V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 72 and V-Anth/Fried, AA 25:727). This 
is done so that we come to feel a certain way about the inner constitution of the action. If we are 
merely punished, we only see an action as bad because of its consequences. But if we are shamed 
for performing an action, Kant claims that we are taught that the action is in itself vicious.  
This early solution to the problem of moral motivation is problematic, however. The 
issue with this solution is that it relegates the intellectual cognition of obligation to a secondary 
or even an inconsequential role when it comes to actually acting morally. For, if this early 
                                                        
23 “Den Menschen dahin zu bringen, daß er die Abscheulichkeit des Laster fühle, ist gar nicht möglich, 
denn ich kann ihm nur das sagen, was mein Verstand einsieht, und so weit bringe ich ihn auch, daß er es 
einsieht, aber daß er den Abscheu fühlen soll, wenn er nicht solche Reitzbarketi der Sinne hat, ist nich 
möglich; [...].“ (V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 71.25-31) 
24 “Ieder kann einsehen, daß die Handlung verabscheuungswürdig ist, aber der diesen Abscheu fühlt, hat 
ein moralische Gefühl. Der Verstand verabscheut nicht, sondern er sieht die Abscheulichkeit ein, und 
wiedersetzt sich derselben, aber die Sinnlichkeit muß nur verabscheuen, wenn nun die Sinnlichkeit das 
jenige verabscheut, was der Verstand als abscheulich einsieht, so ist dieses das moralische Gefühl.“ (V-
Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 71.19-25) 
25 “Allein wir können doch einen habitum hervorbringen, der nicht natürlich ist aber doch die Nature 
vertritt, der durch die Nachahmung und öftere Ausübung zum habitu wird.“ (V-Mo/Kaehler(Stark), 
72.4-6) 
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solution accurately describes moral education, then in order to be attracted to or repulsed by 
actions that are morally good and bad respectively, we only need to form a habit of our feelings 
and train moral feeling via education and religion. It is therefore unclear, according to this 
solution, what role the intellectual cognition of obligation plays, if any, when it comes to 
actually acting morally. In order to become a good person, the intellectual grasp of morality 
could, in principle, be left aside. At the very least, this is not the kind of solution one would 
expect from a philosopher who defines moral philosophy as a ‘pure’ discipline; for what is the 
point of the purely intellectual recognition of moral obligation if it makes no difference for how 
we act? 
Kant’s brief discussion of moral motivation in the Critique of Pure Reason suggests that 
he had not yet settled on his mature solution in the early 1780s either. In the ‘Doctrine of 
Method’, for example, Kant distinguishes between “the motive of happiness [dem 
Bewegungsgrunde der Glückseligkeit]” and the motive of “the worthiness to be happy [die 
Würdigkeit, glücklich zu sein]” (KrV, A 806/ B 834) and identifies the latter as the moral 
motive. This is significant, for this seems to indicate that at the time of the first Critique Kant 
had not yet come to view that respect for the moral is the moral motive. For this reason, Henry 
Allison has described the understanding of moral motivation we find in the first Critique as 
“semi-critical” (see Allison 1990 67). 
In order to deal better with the problem of moral motivation, Kant needs a concept for a 
phenomenon that intimately connects the intellectual recognition of obligation and a 
motivationally efficacious feeling or incentive. This is precisely what the concept of respect for 
the law as the incentive of morality accomplishes in his mature moral philosophy.26 The 
question is: in the runup to Kant’s first presentation of his mature solution to the problem of 
moral motivation, did he come to realize something about the concept of respect itself that 
makes it a fitting solution to this problem? Did Kant invent a new and unique way to use the 
concept of respect such that it functions as a solution to the problem he was facing? Or did he 
come across a fitting usage of respect in the writings of his contemporaries that offered him the 
solution he was looking for? In the remainder of this paper, I argue for the latter option by 
illustrating that the concept of Achtung that Kant would have encountered in the first German 
translation of Smith’s TMS would have presented Kant with a way to handle this problem. 
 
                                                        
26 See DeWitt 2014 for a recent discussion of the way in which respect plays this ‘bridging’ role. 
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3. Smith on Regard and the Sense of Duty 
 
In this section I offer a brief account of two related ideas in Smith’s TMS that are 
strikingly similar to features of Kant’s mature account of respect for the moral law as the 
incentive of moral action: the attitude of regard for the general rules of conduct, and the motive 
of the sense of duty. In the German translation of the TMS, with which Kant was familiar, 
these ideas were translated as Achtung and das Gefühl der Pflicht respectively. This will make it 
possible to illustrate in the final section (4.) both the ways in which Smith’s concept of Achtung 
is similar to Kant’s mature account of respect, as well as how such a concept would have 
provided Kant with an appealing way to deal with the problem of moral motivation.  
 
3.1 Moral Judgement and Regard for the General Rules of Conduct 
 
 The Theory of Moral Sentiments was first published in 1759 and went through six editions 
during Smith’s lifetime. The first German translation of the TMS, by Christian Günther 
Rautenberg, which was published in 1770 and with which Kant was familiar, was based on the 
third edition. This is significant because the central topic of the first five editions of the TMS is 
the nature of moral judgement; it was only in the sixth edition that the TMS was expanded to 
include a number of discussions on the nature of virtue.27 Regard, which I will illustrate was 
translated as Achtung in Rautenberg’s edition of the TMS, is an attitude we take towards what 
Smith called the “general rules of conduct”, and these rules are necessary in order to overcome 
certain deficiencies inherent in how moral self-judgment functions. Thus, before turning to 
regard it will be helpful to briefly turn to Smith’s understanding of moral judgment, the 
problems associated with self-judgement, and the nature of moral rules. 
According to Smith, when we make moral judgements we judge the sentiments, 
affections, or passions28 of others in two ways: we judge 1) whether the sentiment is appropriate 
given its cause, which Smith calls the sentiment’s “propriety,” and 2) whether the sentiment 
                                                        
27 For an account of the development between the editions, see Raphael and Macfie’s Introduction to 
Smith (1976, 15-20). See also Raphael (2007, 1-12) and (2010, 15-18) for a discussion of how moral 
judgement was the central topic of the first five editions, but Smith altered the sixth edition to include a 
discussion of the nature of virtue. 
28 Smith does not make a meaningful distinction between these terms; therefore, I also use them 
interchangeably in this section. 
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deserves reward or punishment given the beneficial or hurtful effects it produces, which Smith 
calls the sentiment’s “merit.” (TMS 18; I.i.3.6-7)29 Judgement happens by placing ourselves, via 
the imagination, in the situation of the person we are judging, whom Smith calls the “person 
principally concerned” (TMS 26; I.i.4.6), and “sympathizing” with them, i.e. assessing whether 
the passions they feel are the same as those we, the spectator, would feel if we were in their 
position. Approval occurs when the passions of the person principally concerned and those of 
the spectator match, disapproval occurs when they differ. When we judge our own actions, this 
procedure is carried out in a similar way, but in order to remove our personal biases we take up 
the position of an ‘impartial spectator’, i.e. an imaginary observer who knows the relevant 
details of the situation but who is not biased to judge in our favour, or anyone else’s. We 
approve of our own sentiments if we imagine that such an impartial spectator would have the 
same sentiments as those we find in ourselves, and disapproval occurs if we imagine that such a 
spectator’s sentiments would disagree with our own. 
 The need for moral rules arises due to certain limitations inherent in how moral self-
judgement functions. Smith addresses two main limitations. First, it is only possible for us to 
judge of our own actions by means of taking up the position of the impartial spectator either if 
we have enough time to do so before acting or in retrospect when judging an action that we 
have already committed. The theory therefore seems inadequate when it comes to evaluating 
what we ought to do “when we are about to act” (TMS 220; III.4.2), i.e. in the heat of the 
moment. This is problematic in that the moment immediately prior to action is of prime 
importance for actually changing our behaviour. Second, Smith claims that even if we are able 
to take up this point of view immediately prior to action, we only obtain “instantaneous 
glimpses, which vanish in a moment, and which even while they last are not altogether just.” 
(ibid.) Indeed, Smith claims that whatever impartiality we achieve at this stage is unreliable 
because we are prone to self-deceit at the time of acting. (see TMS, 220-1; III.4.3) Given these 
two main limitations with his theory of moral self-judgement, taking up the position of the 
impartial spectator is less than ideal if we want to control the way we act when it matters most, 
i.e. right when we are about to perform an action.  
                                                        
29 The distinction between these two kinds of judgement is not particularly important for my 
subsequent discussion. I therefore focus exclusively on ‘propriety’ in the remainder of this paper, which 
is Smith’s own focus in the TMS. 
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The predicament in which we seem to find ourselves here is not hopeless, however. As 
Smith says: “Nature, however, has not left this weakness, which is of so much importance, 
altogether without a remedy; nor has she abandoned us entirely to the delusions of self-love.” 
(TMS 222-3; III.4.7) The way in which nature helps us here is by encouraging us to form rules 
of action: “Our continual observations upon the conduct of others, insensibly lead us to form to 
ourselves certain general rules concerning what is fit and proper either to be done or to be 
avoided.” (ibid.) We observe how others tend to judge actions as well as reflect on how the 
impartial spectator tends to judge our own sentiments30 and those of others and by means of 
inductive generalization we form general rules of action.31 These rules help us overcome the 
above-mentioned limitations with moral self-judgement in that we can quickly and easily both 
remember and refer to unbiased and reliable guides to action when it matters most.  
On Smith’s account, human beings not only naturally wish to gain the favour of others 
(see e.g. III.3.20), they also naturally desire to pursue virtue for its own sake.32 In that the 
general rules capture the sentiments that spectators would approve of, and also wherein virtue 
consists, Smith says that “past experience” (TMS 161; III.4.12) and “habitual reflection” (TMS 
160; III.4.12) encourage us to “resolve” to obey the general rules. If we notice that a certain 
way of acting is always disapproved by others, for example, Smith says we would then “resolve 
never to be guilty of the like, nor ever, upon any account, to render ourselves in this manner 
the objects of universal disapprobation.” (TMS 223; III.4.7) What is important for my purposes 
is that Smith describes this resolution to obey the general rules in terms of taking a specific 
attitude towards them, namely “regard.”  
A good illustration of this attitude in action is Smith’s example of the “man of furious 
resentment” who, in the heat of passion, thinks that the death of his enemy is appropriate 
compensation for committing only a slight provocation. Smith claims that the resentful man is 
held back from this unjust action by the “regard”, “awe”, and “respect” with which he considers 
the general rules of conduct:  
                                                        
30 Indeed, as Smith notes, the general rules are meant to capture the judgements of the impartial 
spectator (see e.g. TMS 227; III.4.12) thus their purpose is to remind us of how our sentiments would be 
judged by such a spectator. 
31 Smith is thus a particularist about moral judgements (see TMS 224; III.4.9; and see Fleischacker 
2017; and Griswold 1999, 186ff) 
32 See (TMS 358; VII.ii.2.15) for one of the rare places where Smith explicitly discusses why virtue 
“ought to be esteemed.” It is perhaps worth noting that Kant’s idea of taking an immediate, moral 
interest in action is similar to Smith’s view that human beings are interested in virtue for its own sake. 
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that reverence for the rule which past experience has impressed upon him, checks the 
impetuosity of his passion, and helps him to correct the too partial views which self-love might 
otherwise suggest, of what was proper to be done in his situation. If he should allow himself to 
be so far transported by passion as to violate this rule, yet, even in this case, he cannot throw off 
altogether the awe and respect with which he has been accustomed to regard it. (TMS 227; 
III.4.12) 
As can be seen here, Smith uses a number of terms to describe the attitude we take towards the 
general rules, but by far the most dominant term he uses through the TMS is “regard”33.  
Although Smith does not explicitly discuss the topic, the attitude of regard can be 
characterized as the recognition of the action-guiding authority of the general rules. With 
respect to the case of the “man of furious resentment”, for example, Smith claims that when 
such a man considers acting on his passions: 
his observations upon the conduct of others, have taught him how horrible all such sanguinary 
revenges appear. Unless his education has been very singular, he has laid it down to himself as 
an inviolable rule, to abstain from them upon all occasions. This rule preserves its authority 
with him, and renders him incapable of being guilty of such a violence. (TMS 160; III.4.12) 
In this passage Smith is describing the process mentioned above, whereby we observe the 
conduct of others (and ourselves), form general rules, and then learn via experience and 
education that following such rules is a means to gain the favour or others and to acquire virtue 
for its own sake. This causes us to ‘lay this rule down to ourselves’ as one that has authority 
over our conduct. In that the rules capture which sentiments we ought to have in a given 
situation, the ‘reverence’, ‘awe’, and ‘respect’ with which this man has come to “regard” the 
general rules thus involve recognizing that they authoritatively command which sentiments we 
ought to have. Indeed, Smith emphasizes that without taking the attitude of regard towards the 
general rules, our passions would simply pursue their own satisfaction without worrying about 
whether or not they ought to do so. (ibid.) Importantly, however, having regard for the general 
rules of conduct does not require that we act accordingly. As Smith’s example of the man of 
furious resentment indicates, even if we do not act as the general rules command, we cannot be 
rid of the awe and respect with which we have come to ‘regard’ them.  
                                                        
33 When referring to the attitude we take towards the general rules Smith variously uses “regard” (TMS 
229, 231, 232, 248, 249, 251, 253, 255, 256, 341, 418, 419, 424), “reverence” (ibid., 227, 230, 232, 233), 
and also “awe and respect” (ibid., 227). As one can see here, just in virtue of the frequency with which 
these terms are used, “regard” is the dominant term. 
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When Smith’s TMS is translated into German for the first time, something interesting 
happens to regard and the other terms Smith uses to describe the attitude taken towards the 
general rules of morality once one resolves to obey them: all of these terms are overwhelmingly 
rendered as “Achtung”. In Rautenberg’s translation, the nouns “regard”, “awe and respect”, and 
“reverence” are inconsistently translated with a number of different expressions, namely 
“Ehrfurcht” (Smith 1770, 311, 313, 314, 315, 349), “Rücksicht auf” (ibid., 339, 345), and, most 
importantly, “Achtung” (ibid., 312, 316, 317, 335, 340, 342, 343, 349, 507, 553, 554, 561). As can 
be seen here, “Achtung” is by far the most dominant term used to capture the attitude taken 
towards the general rules, thus any reader of Smith in translation, such as Kant, would have 
taken Achtung to be the concept Smith uses to capture this attitude. 
 
3.2 The Sense of Duty 
 
In the preceding section we have seen that the general rules of conduct capture the 
sentiments and affections it is proper or meritorious to have in particular situations. In order to 
overcome certain deficiencies in moral self-judgement, we refer to the general rules ‘when we 
are about to act’ in order to access reliable and unbiased guidance on which passion to follow. 
The attitude of regard signifies the fact that we recognize the general rules as authoritative 
over our conduct, i.e. it expresses our awareness that the general rules authoritatively 
command how we should act, even if we do not end up following their advice. Since regard for 
the general rules is action-guiding and thus can alter our behaviour, Smith identifies this 
attitude with a particular “motive” (see e.g. TMS 230; III.5.1), namely the sense of duty. As 
Smith states at the beginning of a section entitled ‘Of the influence and authority of the general 
Rules of Morality’, for example: “The regard to those general rules of conduct, is what is 
properly called a sense of duty.” (TMS 229; III.5.1)  
The sense of duty is a motive in the sense that it can either encourage us to positively 
act in a certain way, or hold us back from acting in ways contrary to the general rules. 
Contrary to what one might except, however, especially from the point of view of Kant’s 
philosophy, the sense of duty is not the only motive or passion, upon which it is praiseworthy 
to act. On the contrary, for Smith it is praiseworthy to act on the basis of many different 
passions, and there are two factors which determine which passion should be at the root of our 
action: first, which sentiment, affection, or passion we are talking about and, second, the 
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“precision and exactness, or the looseness and inaccuracy of the general rules themselves” 
(TMS 248-9; III.6.2). It will be important to briefly examine these two factors in order to better 
see how the sense of duty functions as a motive, for Smith. 
Smith argues that all action proceeds from a “sentiment or affection of the heart” (TMS 
19; I.i.3.5) and he lists three basic passions: the unsocial, the social, and the selfish passions. The 
unsocial passions “are hatred and resentment, with all their different modifications” (TMS 51; 
I.ii.3.1), the social passions are those such as generosity and compassion, i.e. “all the social and 
benevolent affections” (TMS 61; I.ii.4.1) which we find “almost always peculiarly agreeable and 
becoming” (ibid.), and the “selfish passions” or the passions of self-love or those directed 
towards private advantage. (TMS 64ff.; I.ii.5) Acting on the basis of the social and the selfish 
passions is praiseworthy, depending on the situation: although we often ought to act from the 
social passions, for example, there are some circumstances where we should not, such as when 
our “natural generosity” towards a friend can be too strong such as to harm us (see TMS 250; 
III.6.4). Similarly, although Smith argues it is praiseworthy to act on the selfish passions when 
it comes to those things that are “more extraordinary and important” (TMS 252; III.6.7) to us, 
such as our career, we ought not to act on the selfish passions “in all common, little and 
ordinary cases” (TMS 251; III.6.6), such as when it comes to saving money. Looking after our 
wealth is nonetheless something we ought to do, but rather than proceed from self-interest, 
Smith claims we ought to be thrifty solely from our regard to the general rules, i.e. solely from 
our recognition that we ought to do so. (ibid.) In fact, this is only one of two scenarios where 
the sense of duty ought to be the primary motive behind our action, the other being the case of 
the unsocial passions: although most of the actions that our unsocial passions suggest to us 
should be avoided, there are some that Smith argues should still be done, such as punishment.34 
Punishment should be performed but not on the basis of our unsocial passions, but rather “more 
from a sense of the propriety of punishing, than from any savage disposition to revenge” (TMS 
250; III.6.5). In these cases, the sense of duty should positively encourage us to act in the sense 
that it is our primary motive. In most other cases, however, the sense of duty merely holds us 
back from action, such as preventing us from being too generous and harming ourselves in the 
process. 
                                                        
34 Smith famously has a retributive theory of justice and punishment. See Stalley 2012 for a recent 
discussion. 
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Whether or not our sense of duty should be our motive also depends on how precise the 
rules are. When it comes to “the general rules which determine what are the offices of 
prudence, of charity, of generosity, of gratitude, of friendship”, for example, Smith claims they 
“are in many respects loose and inaccurate, admit of many exceptions, and require so many 
modifications, that it is scarce possible to regulate our conduct entirely by a regard to them.” 
(TMS 253; III.6.9) Only the rules of justice are precise enough that they can be relied upon: 
The rules of justice are accurate in the highest degree, and admit of no exceptions or 
modifications […] What I ought to perform, how much I ought to perform, when and where I 
ought to perform it, the whole nature and circumstances of the action prescribed, are all of them 
precisely fixt and determined. (TMS 255; III.6.10) 
Smith even says that “the most sacred regard” is due to these rules because of their accuracy 
and that “the actions which this virtue requires are never so properly performed, as when the 
chief motive for performing them is a reverential and religious regard to those general rules 
which requires them” (TMS 255-6; III.6.10). The more precise the general rules are, then, the 
more should our regard for them, i.e. our sense of duty, be the dominant motive of our action.  
Although the sense of duty ought not always be the dominant motive of our action, 
Smith nonetheless argues that it should be the ruling and governing “principle of our conduct” 
and that philosophy and common sense “directs” this to be the case (TMS 248; III.6.1). What 
Smith means by this is that even in those cases where the sense of duty is not our sole motive 
and we ought to act on a different passion, having the sense of duty as the “ruling and 
governing” principle of conduct means that it ought to “concur” (ibid.) and, in modern 
terminology, ‘over-determine’ our action. When discussing whether or not we should act on the 
social passions, for example, Smith claims that these actions “ought to proceed as much from the 
passions themselves, as from any regard to the general rules of conduct” (TMS 249; III.6.4, my 
emphasis). Presumably the case is similar with respect to those situations where we ought to 
act on our selfish passions; we ought to pursue the significant objects of self-interest, for 
example, both from self-interest and from the sense of duty. Smith’s view, then, is that when the 
sense of duty is the ruling and governing principle of our conduct, the sense of duty is always a 
contributing motive in a number of different ways: it is either our sole motive and positively 
‘enlivens’ us to perform an action (in the case of the insignificant objects of self-interest and 
certain objects of the unsocial passions), it concurs alongside another passion that ought to be 
the primary passion acted upon (in the case of the extraordinary objects of self-interest and 
often with respect to what the social passions suggest), or the sense of duty restricts the force 
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of a passion and either prevents it from becoming too strong (some cases of the social passions), 
or it could in principle also simply prevent us from acting entirely (where the sense of duty 
would be our reason for refraining from acting).  
  If we look at how the sense of duty is rendered in the 1770 Rautenberg translation of 
the TMS, we find some extremely interesting results. The sense of duty is not only translated 
as “das Gefül [sic] der Pflicht” (see Smith 1770 312, 338, 340, 392) and is thus called a feeling, 
but as a motive this ‘feeling’ of duty is dubbed the “Triebfeder” or incentive that should govern 
all action if the sense of duty is our ruling and governing principle of conduct. Consider the 
translation of the following passage, for example: 
That the sense of duty should be the sole principle of our conduct is no where [sic] the precept 
of Christianity; but that it should be the ruling and the governing one, as philosophy, and as, 
indeed, common sense directs. (TMS 248, III.6.1) 
Daß daß [sic] Gefül der Pflicht die einzige Triebfeder unsers Verhaltens seyn soll, das befiehlt 
das Christenthum nirgends: wol aber, daß es nach der Anleitung, die uns die Philosophie, und 
selbst die gesunde Vernunft erteilt, die herrschende und regierende Triebfeder seyn soll. (Smith 
1770, 338) 
As illustrated above, what is most significant about the sense of duty is that Smith identifies this 
‘feeling’, which Rautenberg here dubs an incentive, with the attitude of regard for the general 
rules:  
“The regard to those general rules of conduct, is what is properly called a sense of 
duty.” (TMS 229; III.5.1)  
“Die Ehrfurcht gegen diese allgemeine Regeln des Verhaltens macht eigentlich das aus, 
was man das Gefül der Pflicht nennet […] .“(Smith 1770, 311-312)  
Accordingly, just as Smith occasionally speaks as if regard, rather than the sense of duty, is the 
motive accompanying all action when this is our ruling and governing principle of conduct in 
the original TMS (see e.g. TMS 171; III.6.1: “[…] our actions ought to arise chiefly or entirely 
from a sense of duty, or from a regard to general rules”), so does Rautenberg’s German 
translation occasionally say that we act from Achtung as a Bewegungsgrund or Triebfeder35:  
Der Mann, der blos aus Achtung gegen das, was ein schicklicher Gegenstand der Ehre und des 
Beifalls ist, handelt, wenn gleich Ehre und Beifall ihm allezeit sollten versaget werden, dieser 
                                                        
35 ‘Bewegungsgrund’ and ‘Triebfeder’ were Rautenberg’s inconsistent translations for ‘motive’ and 
‘principle of action’. For examples of ‘Bewegungsgrund’ see Smith (1770, 482, 485, 490, 492, 507-8); and 
for ‘Triebfeder’ see Smith (1770, 142, 169, 338, 352, and 364). 
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handelt aus dem erhabensten und göttlichsten Bewegungsgrunde, dessen die menschliche 
Nature je fähig ist. (Smith 1770, 507) 
Similarly, in the passage where Smith argues that all the common objects of self-interest should 
be pursued from the sense of duty rather than the selfish passions, Rautenberg’s translation 
states that:  
Die Bestrebung nach den Gegenständen des Eigennuzzes muß in allen gemeinen, geringen und 
gewöhnlichen Fällen mehr aus Achtung gegen die allgemeinen Regeln, die ein solches Verhalten 
vorschreiben, als aus einer hizzigen Begierde nach den Gegenständen selbst herrüren. (Smith 
1770, 342, my emphasis)  
A reader of the TMS in its first German translation, therefore, would have come across the 
concept of Achtung as referring to both an attitude and a feeling, and as a concept that both 
functions as and is identified with a motive or incentive, and is accordingly dubbed a 
Bewegungsgrund or Triebfeder. As I illustrate in the next section, this is a technical term that is 
strikingly similar to Kant’s mature understanding of the incentive of respect for the moral law. 
Not only this, rather I argue that Kant would have found it appealing as a way to deal with the 
problem of moral motivation, with which he was wrestling up until the mid-1780s. 
 
4. Kant’s Concept of Respect 
 
 In the paragraphs that follow the Groundwork’s third proposition, where the concept of 
respect appears for the first time in Kant’s published writings, Kant describes respect as having 
two core features: it is both an attitude one can take towards an object, such as the moral law, 
as well as a feeling. These two “aspects” of respect, as Andrews Reath has famously described 
them (1989, 287), are clearly expressed in an important footnote that occurs shortly after the 
third proposition: 
I might be accused of using the word respect just to seek refuge in an obscure feeling, instead of 
giving distinct information about the matter in question by means of a concept of reason. But 
even though respect is a feeling, it is not one received by influence, but one self-wrought by a 
rational concept and therefore specifically different from all feelings of the former kind, which 
come down to inclination or fear.  What I recognize immediately as a law for myself I recognize 
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with respect, which signifies merely the consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law, 
without mediation of other influences on my sense. (GMS, AA 04:401fn, emphasis in original)36 
As described in this passage, respect is both a feeling and a specific kind of “consciousness” or 
way of recognizing the moral law. In order to see the extent to which Kant’s concept of respect 
is similar to Smith’s understanding of Achtung and das Gefül der Pflicht, I here offer an account 
of these two aspects. 
 
4.1 Respect for the Moral Law as the Incentive of Moral Action 
 
In the first instance, respect is an attitude, which means nothing other than a specific 
way in which to cognitively relate to, or be conscious of, a given object.37 From the Groundwork 
onwards, the attitude of respect in Kant’s philosophy has three main objects: 1) the moral law 
(see e.g. GMS, AA 04:400, GMS, AA 04:401fn., KpV, AA 05:71-90), 2) persons insofar as they 
exemplify the moral law (see e.g. GMS, AA 04:435-6, GMS, AA 04:439, KpV, AA 05:76-8), and 
3) persons simply insofar as they are persons or ends-in-themselves (see e.g. MS, AA 06:448-50, 
MS, AA 06:462-8).38 My focus here is the attitude of respect for the law because it is this 
attitude in particular that Kant identifies with a feeling, and which he calls the incentive of 
moral action. Kant also considers respect for the moral law to be primary in the sense that, as 
he repeatedly stresses, “respect for a person is actually only respect for the law”. (GMS, AA 
04:401n, see also KpV, AA 05:81fn.)39 Before turning to respect as a feeling or incentive it will 
thus be important to clarify what the attitude of respect for the law is.40 
                                                        
36 “Man könnte mir vorwerfen, als suchte ich hinter dem Worte Achtung nur Zuflucht in einem dunkelen 
Gefühle, anstatt durch einen Begriff der Vernunft in der Frage deutliche Auskunft zu geben. Allein 
wenn Achtung gleich ein Gefühl ist, so ist es doch kein durch Einfluß empfanges, sondern durch einen 
Vernunftbegriff selbstgewirktes Gefühl und daher von allen Gefühlen der ersteren Art, die sich auf 
Neigung oder Furcht bringen lassen, specifisch unterschieden. Was ich unmittelbar als Gesetz für mich 
erkenne, erkenne ich mit Achtung, welche bloß das Bewußtseyn der Unterordnung meines Willens unter 
einem Gesetze, ohne Vermittlung anderer Einflüsse auf meinen Sinn, bedeutet.“ (GMS, AA 04:401fn) 
37 I do not intend to be making a controversial claim by referring to respect as an attitude. Indeed, other 
Kant scholars have referred to respect in this way as well: Reath has referred to respect as a 
“propositional attitude” (1989, 287); Richard McCarty has called respect a “motivational attitude” (1993, 
425); and Allen Wood and Dieter Schönecker call respect a “rational practical attitude”. (2015, 80) 
38 For more on these three different objects of respect see Klimchuk (2004, 39) and Allison (2011, 128ff. 
and 128n). Mary Gregor only makes a distinction between two types of respect: for the law, and for 
persons who follow the law (see 1963, 181).  
39 “Alle Achtung für eine Person ist eigentlich nur Achtung fürs Gesetz“. (GMS, AA 04:401fn 
40 The attitude of respect for the moral law has received very little direct attention in the secondary 
literature in comparison to that given to the feeling of respect. Kant’s understanding of the attitude of 
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Kant claims that we necessarily respect the moral law as soon as we are conscious of it, 
and in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant explains that we become conscious of the moral law 
by reflecting on the nature of practical principles: 
But how is consciousness of that moral law possible? We can become aware of pure practical 
laws just as we are aware of pure theoretical principles, by attending to the necessity with which 
reason prescribes them to us and to the setting aside of all empirical conditions to which reason 
directs us. (KpV, AA 05:30.3-7)41 
Consciousness of the moral law is thus not something that occurs without some effort and 
requires, as Henry Allison has remarked, some “reflective activity” (2011, 132) on our part.42 
Once we become aware of the moral law, however, Kant claims that we necessarily regard it in a 
certain way or, in other words, we necessarily take a certain attitude towards it, namely respect. 
Jens Timmermann has called this the “inescapability” of respect (2007, 182), and Kant 
highlights this feature of respect throughout his works.43 In the Groundwork, for example, Kant 
claims that “reason” represents all the commands of duty as “worthy of the highest respect” 
                                                        
respect for persons, especially insofar as they are persons/ends-in-themselves, has received a great deal 
of attention in the secondary literature (see Hill (1991); Korsgaard (1996); Wood (1999); and Sensen 
(2011)), in large part because of how influential it has been in contemporary ethics and political 
philosophy. The neglect of attention given to respect as an attitude towards the moral law is surprising 
given Kant’s stress on the priority of respect for the law, and it has resulted in virtually no consideration 
of what kind of attitude respect for the law might be. It is my hope that the discussion in this section 
adds some missing details in this direction. 
41 “Wie ist aber auch das Bewußtsein jenes moralischen Gesetzes möglich? Wir können uns reiner 
praktischer Gesetze bewußt werden, eben so wie wir uns reiner theoretischer Grundsätze bewußt sind, 
indem wir auf die Nothwendigkeit, womit sie uns die Vernunft vorschreibt, und auf Absonderung aller 
empirischen Bedingungen, dazu uns jene hinweiset, Acht haben. (KpV, AA 05:30.3-7) 
42 That we become conscious of the moral law in this way does not conflict with Kant’s famous claim that 
we are conscious of the moral law as a “Factum der Vernunft” (KpV, AA 05:47). Kant’s doctrine of the 
fact of reason concerns the justification of the bindingness of the moral law, which is intrinsic to agents 
who regard themselves as having a will and practical reason, and as such is a ‘fact’ of their reason. This 
does not imply that all human beings are innately conscious of the fundamental law of practical reason; 
indeed, it is only once we start to reflect on maxims (i.e., once we begin acting as practical agents with a 
will) that this fact presents itself to us. For a helpful discussion of this issue, see Kleingeld (2010, esp. 
67-72). I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer at Kant-Studien for encouraging me to clarify this 
point. 
43 Respect not only follows necessarily from our awareness of the moral law, it also follows necessarily 
from our recognition of persons who exemplify the law. Kant emphasizes this in a well-known passage 
from the second Critique: “before a humble common man in whom I perceive uprightness of character in 
a higher degree than I am aware of in myself my spirit bows, whether I want it or whether I do not”; 
“Vor einem niedrigen, bürgerlich gemeinen Mann, an dem ich eine Rechtschaffenheit des Charakters in 
einem gewissen Maße, als ich mir von mir selbst nicht bewußt bin, wahrnehme, bückt sich mein Geist, 
ich mag wollen oder nicht” (KpV, AA 05:77.1-4). 
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(GMS, AA 04:405.6-7)44 and that from the idea of universal legislation “reason extracts from 
me immediate respect”. (GMS, AA 04:403.25-26, emphasis added)45 In the second Critique, Kant 
says that respect is “inseparably connected with the representation of the moral law in every 
finite rational being” (KpV, AA 05:80.6-7, emphasis added)46, and even claims that the idea of 
the moral law within us, “without promising or threatening anything with certainty, demands of 
us disinterested respect” (KpV, AA 05:147.30-31)47. 
 But what does it mean to ‘respect’ the moral law, and what kind of attitude is this? On a 
fundamental level, Kant repeatedly stresses that, as a kind of “consciousness” or awareness of 
the moral law, respect is a kind of recognition. In the Groundwork footnote cited above, for 
example, Kant says that “What I recognize [erkenne] immediately as a law for myself I 
recognize [erkenne] with respect, which signifies merely the consciousness [das Bewußtseyn] of 
the subordination of my will to a law, without mediation of other influences on my sense.” (GMS, 
AA 04:401fn) In the second Critique as well, Kant refers to respect as the “Recognition of the 
moral law”. (KpV, AA 05:79.10)48 In the Religion he claims that respect is connected to “the 
morality alone of the law” as “recognized through reason” (RGV, AA 06:114.5-6)49, and in the 
Metaphysics of Morals that “Respect for the law, which in its subjective aspect is called moral 
feeling, is identical with consciousness of one’s duty.” (MS, AA 06:464.5-6)50 These passages 
also indicate what exactly we recognize when we regard the moral law with respect, namely the 
supreme authority of the moral law; respect for the moral law is to be conscious of the 
“subordination” of one’s will to the law, i.e. that the law is a law for me, and consists in our 
consciousness of being obligated by it. 
  As the recognition of the moral law’s supreme authority over our conduct, Kant’s 
conception of respect for the law is a specific kind of attitude, namely what Stephen Darwall has 
called “moral recognition respect.” (1977, 40) As opposed to “appraisal respect” which “consists 
                                                        
44 “die Vernunft so hochachtungswürdig vorstellt“ (GMS, AA 04:405.6-7) 
45 “zeingt mir die Vernunft unmittelbare Achtung ab“. (GMS, AA 04:403.25-26) 
46 “unzertrennlich mit der Vorstellung des moralischen Gesetzes in jedem endlichen vernünftigen 
Wesen verbunden.“ (KpV, AA 05:80.6-7) 
47 “ohne uns etwas mit Sicherheit zu verheißen, oder zu drohen, von uns uneigennützige Achtung 
fordert“. (KpV, AA 05:147.30-31) For similar statements about the inseparability of the awareness of the 
law and the attitude of respect for it see: MS, AA 06:402-3; RGV, AA 06:27-8; RGV, AA 06:181. 
48 “Die Anerkennung des moralischen Gesetzes [...]”. (KpV, AA 05:79.10) 
49 “die bloße Moralität des Gesetzes [...] durch die Vernunft erkannt“. (RGV, AA 06:114.5-6) 
50 „Die Achtung vor dem Gesetze, welche subjectiv als moralische Gefühl bezeichnet wird, ist mit dem 
Bewußtsein seiner Pflicht einerlei.“ (MS, AA 06:464.5-6) See also e.g. V-NR/Feyerabend, AA 27:1327; 
V-MS/Vigil, AA 27:549; V-MS/Vigil AA 27:582 
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in an attitude of positive appraisal” directed primarily towards a person, “either as a person or 
as engaged in some particular pursuit” (Darwall 1977, 38), and which comes in degrees given it 
must be “earned” (ibid., 41), Darwall describes “recognition respect” as “giving the appropriate 
recognition to a fact in one’s deliberations about how to act.” (ibid., 40) “Moral” recognition 
respect in particular is as follows: 
some fact or feature is an appropriate object of [moral recognition] respect if inappropriate 
consideration or weighing of that fact or feature would result in behaviour that is morally 
wrong. To respect something is thus to regard it as requiring restrictions on the moral 
acceptability of actions connected with it. (ibid., 40) 
For Kant, respecting the moral law is just such as attitude: it is to regard the moral law as 
placing restrictions on action where, if disobeyed, it would result in action that is morally 
wrong. The attitude of respect for the moral law is thus a kind of recognition, namely “the 
immediate recognition of its [the moral law’s] authority” (Reath 1989, 287) or a subject’s 
recognition of themselves as “intrinsically bound by it” as a moral agent. (see Berg, 
forthcoming)51 
  Respect is not only an attitude, of course; it is also a feeling. Respect is in fact a special 
kind of feeling in that it is not “received by influence [durch Einfluß empfangenes]” (GMS, AA 
04:401n) and thus is neither a feeling of pleasure nor displeasure (KpV, AA 05:77). On the 
contrary, respect is a feeling “self-wrought by a rational concept [durch einen Vernunftbegriff 
selbstgewirktes]” (GMS, AA 04:401n) in that it is connected to the attitude that necessarily results 
from consciousness of the moral law, and as such it is not passively received, but actively 
produced by reason. As such, respect is a rational52 or “moral feeling [ein moralisches Gefühl]” 
(KpV, AA 05:75.18), as opposed to a pathological feeling. As Kant says in the second Critique, 
respect is a feeling “that is not of empirical origin [das nicht empirischen Urpsrungs ist]” 
(KpV, AA 05:73.33) and has an “intellectual cause [intellectuellen Ursache]” (KpV, AA 
05:79.8).  
The feeling of respect also functions as what Kant has famously called “the sole and also 
the undoubted moral incentive”. (KpV, AA 05:78.20-21)53 As previously mentioned, the feeling 
                                                        
51 The limited literature that directly addresses the nature of the attitude of respect for the moral law 
includes Reath 1989, Berg, forthcoming, Wood and Schönecker 2015, Noller 2019, DeWitt, 2014, and 
Bratu 2017. 
52 For a recent discussion on the possibility of rational feelings in Kant’s philosophy, see Cohen 2018. 
53 “die einzige und zugleich unbezweifelte moralische Triebfeder“. (KpV, AA 05:78.20-21) 
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of respect and its role as the incentive of moral action is one of the most controversial aspects of 
Kant’s moral philosophy. A major part of the controversy has surrounded the question of 
whether or not and in what way a psychological state like a feeling could play a role in moral 
motivation for a philosopher like Kant whose purpose is “to work out for once a pure moral 
philosophy, completely cleansed of everything empirical and belongs to anthropology.” (GMS, 
AA 04:389.7-9)54 I cannot enter into this controversy here, but by calling the feeling of respect 
an incentive, Kant is signaling that respect is not only just a feeling and an attitude, but is also 
in some way involved in action performed for the sake of the moral law alone, whether it plays 
a positive, contributing role or is merely a part of the experience of acting morally. 
The important feature to highlight about respect is that Kant understands its two core 
aspects, i.e. its nature as both an attitude and a feeling, as intimately related. Kant says this 
explicitly in the Metaphysics of Morals, where he states that they are identical: “Respect for the 
law, which in its subjective aspect is called moral feeling, is identical with consciousness of 
one’s duty”. (MS, AA 06:464.5-6)55 This means that having the attitude of respect for the moral 
law is at one and the same time to experience a particular feeling. Reath has described this fact 
about respect as follows: 
though distinguishable, these aspects of respect need not be phenomenologically distinct, but 
would be experienced together. As a result, the immediate recognition of the Moral Law and the 
feeling which it produces represent connected aspects of what is in us a single phenomenon. 
(1989, 290) 
                                                        
54 “einmal eine reine Moralphilosophie zu bearbeiten, die von allem, was nur empirisch sein mag und zur 
Anthropologie gehört, völlig gesäubert wäre”. “to work out for once a pure moral philosophy, 
completely cleansed of everything empirical and belongs to anthropology.” (GMS, AA 04:389.7-9) Some 
commentators, such as Reath, suggest that it is not the feeling at all, but the attitude of respect, or what 
Reath calls its “intellectual” or “practical” aspect, that functions as the incentive, and the feeling of 
respect is merely “epiphenomenal” and part of the experience of acting morally (see Reath 1989, 287 and 
Sytsma 1993, 121) The majority of the recent literature distances itself from this interpretation, 
however, and is overwhelmingly in agreement that the feeling of respect plays a positive role in Kant’s 
empirical psychology of moral motivation. (See e.g. Guyer (2010), McCarty (2009), Ware (2014), and 
Wood and Schönecker (2015)). I side with this latter group of interpreters. Frierson has done the most 
work to explain how exactly this works on the level of empirical psychology (see 2005 and 2014). 
55 “Die Achtung vor dem Gesetze, welche subjectiv als moralisches Gefühl bezeichnet wird, ist mit dem 
Bewußtsein seiner Pflicht einerlei.“ (MS, AA 06:464.5-6) 
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Accordingly, although the attitude of respect comes first in the sense that we necessarily regard 
the moral law in this way as soon as we are conscious of it, on Kant’s view having the attitude 
is inseparable from experiencing a particular feeling.56 
The question now is: to what degree is this understanding of Achtung similar to what 
Smith calls regard and the sense of duty, and which were translated as Achtung and das Gefül der 
Pflicht? Are they similar in such a way that Kant might have adopted core elements of the 
concept of Achtung as it appears in the first German translation of the TMS for his own 
purposes, for example in order to deal the problem of moral motivation? 
 
 4.2 Achtung in Kant and Smith 
 
In the first section of this paper I illustrated that ever since Kant rejected what has been 
called the ‘continuity thesis’ and came to think of intellectual and sensible cognitions as 
different in kind he was faced with a problem concerning moral motivation that would persist 
into the Critical period. Without any continuity between the intellect and sensibility, it 
becomes impossible to explain how a purely intellectual recognition of moral obligation could 
bring one to feel a corresponding sensible incentive to act accordingly. Kant’s early solution to 
this problem was to say that we are faced with the task of forming habits and training 
sensibility in a way that corresponds to our intellectual grasp of moral obligation. I argued that 
this solution is unsatisfactory because it assigns the intellectual grasp of obligation little, if any, 
role in moral practice. I also illustrated that even in the first Critique Kant had not yet 
developed his characteristic view of respect for the moral law as the incentive of morality. It is 
only in the mid-1780s, the Feyerabend lecture notes on natural law and the Groundwork, that 
Kant’s mature concept of respect makes its first appearance. 
                                                        
56 That we necessarily take the attitude of respect towards the moral law as soon as we are conscious of 
it, and that the feeling of respect necessarily results from the attitude, should not suggest that Kant 
believes that one need only be aware of the moral law to possesses the good disposition. It only means 
that anyone who is aware of the moral law must recognize that it is supremely normative, i.e., they must 
acknowledge that the moral law commands how we ought to act, all things considered. Thus, even 
Kant’s “most hardened scoundrel” (4:454.21), who presumably does not possess the good disposition, 
nonetheless wishes to have such a disposition, and therefore recognizes that this is what they ought to 
strive for. In order to actually possess a good disposition, we must not only recognize the law and act in 
accordance with how we recognize we ought to, rather we must also ‘incorporate’ an incentive into our 
maxim, i.e., become the kind of person who does their duty from respect for the moral law consistently, 
reliably, and as a matter of principle. I thank an anonymous reviewer at Kant-Studien for encouraging 
me to clarify this point. 
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 In section 2 I illustrated that a reader of Smith’s TMS in its first German translation 
would have encountered a concept that we are now in the position to see is very similar to what 
we find in Kant’s mature moral philosophy. In Rautenberg’s edition of the TMS, Achtung is the 
attitude towards the general rules of conduct that Smith calls “regard” and it signifies our 
recognition of the authority and action-guiding character of these rules. Not only this, but 
Achtung is identified with what Smith calls the ‘sense of duty’, translated as das Gefül der Pflicht, 
and as a “motive” it is dubbed both a Bewegungsgrund and a Triebfeder. In Kant’s mature moral 
philosophy, Kant’s technical use Achtung is similarly both the recognition of the authority of the 
moral law and a feeling that is identified with this attitude and which functions as the incentive 
(Triebfeder) of moral action. This is a technical understanding of Achtung and is distinct from 
any of the more ordinary uses of the term that we find in Kant’s pre-Critical writings, before his 
exposure to Smith. Not only is this similarity striking, but these concepts are similar in such a 
way that, faced with the problem of moral motivation, Achtung in the first German translation 
of the TMS would have presented Kant with an interesting way to deal with this problem: 
although it is impossible to explain how objective, intellectual judgement can bring about a 
subjective, sensible incentive, the concept of Achtung links these two components in a single 
complex phenomenon. It is thus perhaps no surprise that we find the same concept in Kant’s 
mature moral philosophy with a similar conceptual structure. For Kant, Achtung also has both a 
cognitive and a sensible component. As a cognitive attitude, both regard and respect are types 
of recognition, namely the recognition of a moral command. Furthermore, both of these attitudes 
are identified with a ‘feeling’ that functions as a motive or incentive.  
There are of course significant differences between the moral philosophies of Kant and 
Smith more generally, and also their moral psychologies in particular. There are too many to 
address here in detail, but there are a select few that are important to mention. First, Kant’s 
moral philosophy is centered around one supreme, unconditionally binding, a priori practical 
law, namely the moral law. Smith, by contrast, is a moral particularist who holds that there are 
many ‘general rules of conduct’ that we are conditionally bound by on the basis of two pre-
existing natural desires: 1) the favour of others, and 2) our interest in virtue for its own sake. 
Second, and importantly, the concept of autonomy is entirely absent from Smith’s TMS and 
indeed is a concept sometimes regarded as having been ‘invented’ by Kant (see Schneewind 
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1998, 3).57 Third, and lastly, Kant’s understanding of Achtung is in certain respect more 
developed and at the very least adapted by Kant to fit within his broader philosophy and moral 
psychology. Whereas Smith leaves out many details about how the attitude and the feeling of 
Achtung are connected, Kant specifies that reason causes the feeling of respect, and he has a story 
to tell about how exactly cognition, feeling, and desire interact such that a cognition can 
produce a feeling, which functions as an incentive in the sense of an impelling cause of desire. 
(see Frierson 2005 and 2014) Nonetheless, the core structure of the concept of Achtung in 
Rautenberg’s translation of the GMS is what Kant would have found appealing as a way to deal 
with the problem of moral motivation: it is a complex concept that links two mental faculties 
that Kant’s broader philosophical commitments drastically separated, namely the intellect and 
sensibility.58 Although the concept of respect may still be wanting in that it does not help 
                                                        
57 It is important to note that, similar to respect, the concept of autonomy makes its first published 
appearance in the Groundwork as well and only elements of it appear in unpublished writings between 
1770 and 1785. (see Sensen 2018) The concept of respect is of course closely linked to the concept of 
autonomy, in that it is only the moral law that we autonomously subject ourselves to that necessitates 
that we regard it with respect, so it is no surprise that they both appear in Kant’s writings around the 
same time. A question that arises is whether respect or autonomy is the primary discovery in Kant’s 
intellectual development in the sense that the discovery of the one lead to the discovery of the other. I 
cannot answer this question here, but it is worth noting that a third option has recently been argued for 
by Oliver Sensen that agrees with the developmental story that I have described in this paper, namely 
that’s Kant’s evolving understanding of moral motivation leading up to the mature view that we find in 
the Groundwork onwards might be the key to them both, i.e., it was only once Kant settled on his mature 
understanding of moral motivation that the key pieces of respect, which I have claimed was influenced 
by Smith, and autonomy could fall into place. (see Sensen 2018) 
58 If Kant adopted core features of Smith’s concept of Achtung as I have suggested here, then Kant must 
have returned to Smith to Smith during the 1780s – after the first Critique’s “semi-Critical” conception 
of moral motivation and prior to the first appearance of Kant’s technical understanding of respect in 
Feyerabend and the Groundwork. However, as Norton and Kuehn have stated, scholars agree that Kant 
likely read Rautenberg’s translation of the TMS soon after it appeared in 1770. (2000, 978) If the 
account I have offered in this paper is correct, one might thus be tempted to ask why Kant took so long 
to incorporate an idea he was presumably already familiar with in the 1770s, and should have been 
appealing as a solution to the problem of moral motivation much earlier than the mid-1780s. A likely 
answer here is that even if Kant had already noticed Smith’s concept of Achtung soon after he was first 
exposed to the TMS in the early 1770s, he simply had not yet settled on the right solution to the 
problem of moral motivation. Indeed, during the 1770s Kant’s attention was directed towards finishing 
the first Critique, not his moral philosophy – he had already been putting of the task of a Metaphysics of 
Morals for some time already (see Kuehn 2010). It would therefore not be surprising that, once the 
monumental task of writing the first Critique was finished, Kant turns his attention towards moral 
philosophy and revisits the moral writers he earlier found so inspirational. In fact, Clemens Schwaiger 
has argued that Kant undertook a re-reading of other British philosophers in the mid-1780s because we 
suddenly find a number of references to Hutcheson, Hume, and especially Shaftesbury in his lecture 
notes that stem from this time period. (see Schwaiger 1999, 190-191, note 719; and V-NR/Feyerabend, 
AA 27:1325;V-NR/Feyerabend, AA 27:1325;V-NR/Feyerabend, AA 27:1330; V-Phil-Th/Pölitz, AA 
28:1073, V-Phil-Th/Pölitz, AA 28:1081) Perhaps Kant revisited Smith during this time as well.  If he 
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explain how these two aspects of our being our related, as commentators have complained since 
the first publication of Kant’s moral philosophy59, the concept of Achtung would have offered 





 In this paper I have argued that Kant’s concept of respect for the moral law as the 
incentive of action with moral worth has its roots in Smith’s understand of the attitude of 
regard for the general rules of conduct and the related motive of the sense of duty. Not only 
this, but I have suggested that, given Kant was struggling to solve a problem concerning the 
workings of moral motivation at a time when he would have been exposed to Smith’s TMS, the 
concept of Achtung in Rautenberg’s translation of Smith’s text would have provided Kant with a 
more appealing way to deal with the problem than the strategy Kant employed during the 
1770s. I thereby hope to have illustrated an important and underappreciated way in which 
Smith’s moral philosophy had a lasting and significant impact on an important part of Kant’s 
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did so, he would have re-encountered the concept of Achtung and would have realized that it functions as 
a fitting way to deal with a problem he was still trying to solve. 
59 See Rehberg, 1788 for one of the earliest criticisms of Kant’s concept of respect in this direction. 
60 The author would like to thank audiences at the St. Andrews/Stirling Kant Reading Party, the Mainz 
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